Fuchino-Maschio-Sakai [7] proved that the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski (LST) property of Stationary Logic is equivalent to the Diagonal Reflection Principle on internally club sets (DRPIC) introduced in [4]. We prove that the restriction of the LST property to (downward) reflection of Π 1 1 formulas, which we call the Π 1 1 ↓-LST property, is equivalent to the internal version of DRP from [2]. Combined with results from [2], this shows that the Π 1 1 ↓-LST Property for Stationary Logic is strictly weaker than the full LST Property for Stationary Logic, though if CH holds they are equivalent.
Introduction
Stationary Logic is a relatively well-behaved fragment of Second Order Logic introduced by Shelah [12] , and first investigated in detail by Barwise et al [1] . Stationary Logic augments first order logic by introducing a new second order quantifier stat; we typically interpret "statZ φ(Z, . . . )" to mean that there are stationarily many countable Z such that φ(Z, . . . ) holds. 1 The quantifier aa stands for "almost all" or "for club many"; so aaZ φ(Z, . . . )
is an abbreviation for ¬ statZ ¬ φ(Z, . . . ).
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Section 2 provides more details. By structure we will always mean a first order structure in a countable signature. The question of whether every structure has a "small" elementary substructure in Stationary Logic was raised already in [1] . One cannot hope to always get countable elementary substructures; e.g. if κ is regular and uncountable, then (κ, ∈) satisfies "∈ is a linear order and aaZ ∃x x is an upper bound of Z", but no countable linear order can satisfy that sentence. In a footnote in [1] , it was observed that even the statement "Every structure has an elementary (w.r.t. Stationary Logic) substructure of size ≤ ω 1 " (LST) carries large cardinal consistency strength. 2 The quoted statement above is now typically called the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski (LST) property of Stationary Logic. 3 Fuchino et al. recently proved that LST is equivalent to a version of the Diagonal Reflection Principle introduced in Cox [4]: [7] ). LST is equivalent to the Diagonal Reflection Principle on internally club sets (DRP IC ).
The purpose of the present note is to prove the following variant of Theorem 1. Cox [2] proved that DRP IC is strictly stronger than DRP internal . This was obtained by forcing over a model of a strong forcing axiom in a way that preserved DRP internal while killing DRP IC (in fact killing RP IC ; the argument owed much to Krueger [10] ). Furthermore, if CH holds, then DRP IC is equivalent to DRP internal . Combining those results with Theorem 1.2 immediately yields: 
We note that while the technical strengthening MM ++ of Martin's Maximum implies DRP IC (see [4] ), recent work of Cox-Sakai [6] shows that Martin's Maximum alone does not imply even the weakest version of DRP. Section 2 covers the relevant preliminaries, and Section 3 proves Theorem 1.2. Section 4 ends with some concluding remarks.
Preliminaries
Recall that S ⊆ [A] ω is stationary if it meets every closed, unbounded subset of [A] ω (in the sense of Jech [9] ). By Kueker [11] this is equivalent to requiring that for every f :
In what follows, we will use uppercase letters to denote second order variables/parameters, and lowercase letters to denote first order variables/parameters. We will also use some standard abbreviations; e.g. if our language includes the ∈ symbol, v is a first order variable, and Z is a second order variable,
Given a structure A = (A, . . . ) (which we always assume to have a countable signature), the satisfaction relation in Stationary Logic is defined recursively by:
We define a hierarchy of formulas in Stationary Logic that mimics the usual hierarchy in Second Order Logic. Since aaZ φ(Z, . . . ) roughly translates as ∃C C is club and ∀Z ∈ C φ(Z, . . . ), the aa quantifier will correspond to the existential second order quantifier when constructing the hierarchy. Similarly, since statZ φ(Z, . . . ) roughly translates as
the stat quantifier will correspond to the universal second-order quantifier.
Definition 2.1. A formula in Stationary Logic without second order quantifiers will be denoted by Σ 1 0 or Π 1 0 . For n > 0, a formula of the form
where φ is Σ 1 n−1 will be called a Π 1 n formula, and a formula of the form
is a Π 1 2 formula. Definition 2.2. We say that the LST property holds for Stationary Logic iff for every structure A = (A, . . . ) 5 there exists a W ⊆ A of size ≤ ω 1 such that for all formulas φ in Stationary Logic with no free occurrences of second order variables, and all first order parameters p 1 , . . . , p k ∈ W ,
We say that the Π 1 1 ↓ LST property holds for Stationary Logic iff for every structure A = (A, . . . ) there exists a W ⊆ A of size ≤ ω 1 such that for all Π 1 1 formulas φ in Stationary Logic with no free occurrences of second order variables, and all first order parameters p 1 , . . . ,
Remark 2.3. Note that in the definition of the Π 1 1 ↓ LST property, we only require that Π 1 1 formulas reflect downward. If there is always an ω 1 sized substructure that reflects Π 1 1 formulas both upward and downward, then the full LST property holds. This issue is discussed further in Section 4. 5 Recall we always assume countable signature, though for everything discussed in this paper an ω1-sized signature would still be fine.
We consider variants of the Diagonal Reflection Principle introduced in Cox [4] and [2] . We use the following definition, which by Cox-Fuchs [5] is equivalent to the definitions from [4] and [2] : Definition 2.4. DRP internal asserts that for every sufficiently large regular θ, there are stationarily many W ∈ ℘ ω 2 (H θ ) such that:
The "internal" part of the definition refers to the fact that we require that S ∩ W ∩ [W ∩ A] ω is stationary, not merely that S ∩ [W ∩ A] ω is stationary. Definition 2.4 is simply the diagonal version of an internal variant of WRP introduced in Fuchino-Usuba [8] (see Cox [2] for a discussion).
Proof of Theorem 1.2
We prove a slightly stronger variant of Theorem 1.2. The proof below is strongly influenced by Fuchino et al [7] .
Theorem 3.1. The following are equivalent:
(1) DRP internal .
(2) For every structure A = (A, . . . ), there is a W ⊆ A of size at most ω 1 such that for every finite list p 1 , . . . , p k ∈ W ∩ A and every formula φ without 2nd order quantifiers,
(3) The Π 1 1 ↓-LST property holds of Stationary Logic (as in Definition 2.2); (4) For every structure A = (A, . . . ), there is a W ⊆ A of size at most ω 1 such that for every formula ψ in 2nd order prenex form with no free occurrences of second order variables, and every finite list p 1 , . . . , p k of elements of W , if
then, lettingψ be the formula obtained from ψ by changing all aa quantifiers to stat quantifiers,
Before proving the theorem, we remark that in parts 2, 3, and 4 of Theorem 3.1, we only mentioned first order parameters from W ∩ A. If the structure A is sufficiently rich then it often makes sense to also speak of second-order parameters that are elements of W . But in general (e.g. when A is a group) it is more natural to only speak of first order parameters from W ∩ A. is obviously a Π 1 1 formula. To see that (2) implies (1), assume (2) and suppose θ is a regular cardinal ≥ ω 2 . We need to find a W ≺ (H θ , ∈) such that |W | = ω 1 ⊂ W and for every s ∈ W that is a stationary collection of countable sets,
Consider A = (H θ , ∈). Let W ⊂ H θ be as in the statement of (2). Fix any s ∈ W that is a stationary collection of countable sets. Then
A |= statZ ∃p p = Z ∩ s and p ∈ s and hence, since s ∈ W and the only second order quantifier in the (prenex) formula above is a stat quantifier, A|W |= statZ ∃p p = Z ∩ s and p ∈ s.
Unravelling the definition of the satisfaction relation, this means that
To see that ω 1 ⊂ W , it suffices to show that W ∩ ω 1 is uncountable (since by first-order elementarity of W in (H θ , ∈), W ∩ ω 1 is transitive). Now A |= statZ ∃p ∃α p = Z ∩ ω 1 , α < ω 1 , and α is an upper bound of p , so by assumption on W , this statement is also satisfied by A|W (note that the parameter ω 1 is an element of W because ω 1 is first-order definable in A and W is at least first-order elementary in A). If W ∩ ω 1 were countable, say W ∩ ω 1 = δ < ω 1 , it would follow that for stationarily many Z ∈ W ∩ [W ] ω , there is an α < W ∩ ω 1 = δ such that α is an upper bound of Z ∩ δ. This would be a contradiction, since due to the countability of δ, the set of
Finally, to prove that (1) implies (4): fix a structure A = (A, . . . ) and let θ be a sufficiently large regular cardinal with A ∈ H θ . By (1) there is a W ≺ (H θ , ∈, A) witnessing DRP internal . We prove by induction on complexity of formulas ψ in 2nd order prenex form that if p 1 , . . . , p k ∈ W ∩A and
then, lettingψ be the result of replacing all aa quantifiers with stat quantifiers,
We actually need to inductively prove a slightly stronger statement: namely, that whenever ψ is a 2nd order prenex formula, p 1 , . . . , p k ∈ W ∩ A, and
So suppose
where Q is either the aa or stat quantifier, U 1 , . . . , U k are each elements of W ∩ [A] ω , p 1 , . . . , p ℓ ∈ W ∩ A, and the inductive hypothesis holds of the formula φ. Now regardless of whether Q is the aa or stat quantifier,
and by (2) (since the aa quantifier is stronger than the stat quantifier)
Concluding remarks
We remark that it is straightforward to show, in ZFC alone, that: 
We briefly sketch the proof of the lemma; more details, and other related results, can be found in Cox [3] . One proves by induction on complexity of formulas, making use of (3), that if φ is Σ 1 1 , p 1 , . . . , p k ∈ W ∩ A, and
This was basically part of the proof from Fuchino et al [7] that DRP IC implied the LST for Stationary Logic. See [3] for some other related ZFC theorems.
So by Lemma 4.1 one can always get an ω 1 sized substructure that reflects all Σ 1 1 statements downward. And if DRP internal holds, one can also get an ω 1 sized substructure that reflects all Π 1 1 statements downward. But it is consistent that both of these are true, yet no single ω 1 -sized substructure downward reflects all Π 1 1 and all Σ 1 1 statements. In particular, in any model where DRP internal holds and DRP IC fails, Theorem 1.2 tells us that there is a structure such that no ω 1 -sized substructure reflects all Π 1 1 and all Σ 1 1 statements (though there are structures that reflect one or the other). Another way to view this phenomenon, in terms of DRP-like principles, is that DRP internal yields stationarily many W ∈ ℘ ω 2 (H θ ) such that the transitive collapse H W of W is "correct about stationary sets"; i.e. whenever s ∈ H W and H W |= "s is a stationary set of countable sets", then V believes this too. However, if W is not internally club, it is possible (by [2] ) that H W is correct about stationary sets, but is not correct about clubs; i.e. there can be a c ∈ H W such that H W |= "c is a club of countable sets", but V does not believe this. If, on the other hand, W witnesses DRP IC , then H W is correct about both stationarity and clubness.
